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IMACHI NKWU : TRADE AND THE COMMONS
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. The conventional view is that an increase in the value of a natural resource
can lead to private property over it. Many Igbo groups in Nigeria, however, curtailed
private rights over palm trees in response to the palm produce trade of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. I present a simple game between a resource owner and a
thief. An increase in the resource price leads the owner to prefer a communal harvesting
arrangement that simplifies monitoring, leaving the thief no worse off. I use this model
along with colonial court records to explain property disputes in interwar Igboland.
“Palm cutting always cause palaver.”
Obuba of Ububa, Nkwo Udara Civil Suit 111/37
1. INTRODUCTION
Rights over land and trees are central to poor farmers’ economic decisions and well-
being. In many African societies, group rights exist over these. While there is debate
over the efficiency of African tenure systems (Brasselle et al., 2002; Bruce and Migot-
Adholla, 1994; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Platteau, 1996), secure rights to land promote
investment and efficiency, both in Africa (Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008) and in
other parts of the world (Feder and Onchan, 1987; Shaban, 1987). Why, then, do group
rights persist? In this paper, I introduce a simple model to explain the adoption of com-
munal palm harvesting (imachi nkwu) in response to commercialization of palm oil
among the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria.1
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The key result is that, if the price of palm oil rises above a certain threshold, commu-
nal property will improve the welfare of property owners while making potential thieves
no worse off. Communal harvesting simplified the act of detecting theft, lowering its
marginal cost. Monitoring under private property was largely undertaken by the prop-
erty owner or his relatives, was non-cooperative, and required proving that a thief had
attempted to steal oil from the owner’s trees. Under communal property, thieves needed
only to be caught taking more than their share by harvesting on the wrong day. Any
member of the community could catch a thief. Though property owners surrendered
a share of the harvest under common property, rising palm oil prices increased the in-
centive to steal, accentuating the benefits of this arrangement. In addition, communal
harvesting gave potential thieves incentives to monitor. Anything stolen was now also
taken away from their share of the harvest. The value of this loss rose with the price
of oil. Because theft often occurred before palm fruits were fully ripe, the costs of early
harvesting were now borne in part by potential thieves. These incentives increased ag-
gregate monitoring under communal property, reducing returns to effort in theft and
the responsiveness of this effort to the price of oil.
I validate this model using information recorded in colonial Native Court transcripts.
I use these materials in two ways. First, these provide historical evidence on how prop-
erty rights worked, how they changed, and how they were negotiated. Second, these
records serve as evidence that the mechanisms highlighted by the model were those
that drove the transition from private to communal harvesting.
Disputes over palm harvesting reflected a split between property-owning elders and
thieving youths who wished to steal oil in order to pay for bride price, taxation, school-
ing, and other expenses that required cash. This is evident from both the language and
facts of the cases. In addition to the economic value of palm oil, the cases show that
controlling access to palm produce was a source of political authority. Communal har-
vesting was a means for elders to retain symbolic control while making economic con-
cessions. The cases reveal that the defense of property rights was costly, and was com-
plicated by the need to prove both points of fact and points of law. While it was also
costly to prevent violation of communal harvesting arrangements, the types of effort
that went into monitoring under both arrangements show that it was easier to defend
against thieves under communal harvesting. Communal harvesting was a scheme to
reduce effort costs, though the specific rules used to implement it varied considerably
across communities.
I extend the model to include colonial taxes, and argue that youths’ needs to collect oil
for tax payment made it rational for elders to surrender some of their rights. This too is
evident in the court records. The need to pay tax encouraged greater theft by youths, and
spurred the creation of communal harvesting arrangements. The conflict that occurred
individual, corporation, or other small group can exclude others and regulate use of the resource. Fourth,
under common property, an identifiable community of users can exclude others and regulate use.
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over this transition drew in colonial officials, who struggled to simultaneously maintain
the prestige and authority of the elders on whom they depended to implement colonial
rule, while averting social conflict and collecting tax revenue.2
This model and the evidence from Igbo society are relevant to three broader ques-
tions. First, why does common property exist? Demsetz (1967) argues that private prop-
erty emerges to internalize externalities.3 Boserup (1965), alternatively, focuses on pop-
ulation pressure as the root of private property. These explanations suggest that trade
will cause a shift from common to private property, ignoring possibilities such as de-
generation into open-access (Baland and Platteau, 1998). By contrast, the literature on
common property resources stresses scale economies, risk pooling, and equity as bene-
fits that help explain why the commons survives (Baland and Francois, 2005; Baland and
Platteau, 2003; Grantham, 1980; McCloskey, 1975a,b, 1976; Netting, 1976; Ostrom, 1991;
Runge, 1986). This literature emphasizes problems with enclosure that limit its benefits.
Division entails surveying, defining, registering, marking, and defending rights, all of
which are costly. Those who benefit from division may not have the power to demand it.
Monitoring common property may be cheaper, since users can work together to moni-
tor each other and exclude outsiders. If there are limited returns to investment, the ben-
efits of division may be low. Formal treatments, similarly, show that movement towards
private property is neither inevitable nor necessarily efficient (de Meza and Gould, 1992;
Gonzalez, 2007; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Hafer, 2006; Muthoo, 2004; Tornell, 1997).
Second, what facilitates collective action? For common property to work, communi-
ties must be able to effectively regulate the commons. The literature (cited above, also
Baland and Platteau (1999); McCarthy et al. (2001); Olson (1965); Tarui (2007); Wade
(1987)) suggests several conditions for successful collective action. Group cohesiveness
provides past experiences of cooperation, existing arrangements, punishment systems,
networks of mutual obligation, shared norms of reciprocity, trust, clear and stable group
membership, and low rates of exit. Violations of social rules must be well-defined, es-
pecially in the enforcement of uncoordinated mechanisms (Greif, 1993). Feasibility de-
mands that inexpensive means of conflict resolution and clear boundaries exist, so that
intruders and violators are readily detectable and easily punished. Information about
the limits of the resource convinces users to participate in regulation. Resource value
makes regulation vital and worthwhile. Inequality and population have ambiguous ef-
fects.
Third, how does trade affect the commons? Trade may shape the sustainability of re-
source use and the nature of property rights. International trade may hasten resource
exhaustion under common property or open access (Lopez, 1998; Taylor and Brander,
1997). Hotte et al. (2000) suggest that trade can convert open access into private prop-
erty, though this may not be socially efficient. Copeland and Taylor (2009) argue that, at
2The relationship between taxation and common property is not unique to Nigeria. In Russia, for exam-
ple, peasant communes facilitated the collection of collectively-owed taxes (Nafziger, 2010).
3See also Hardin (1968) and North (1990).
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low prices, open access should prevail. With price increases, however, private property,
limited management, or the continuation of open access can occur, depending on state
capacity, resource growth, and technology. The literature has not, to my knowledge,
considered that price increases could lead to a transition from private to common prop-
erty. In practice, many communities, ranging from irrigation users in the Philippines to
herders in Switzerland, have been able to successfully regulate existing common prop-
erty resources for commercial use (Ostrom, 1991).
In the Igbo case, there were no economies of scale in palm harvesting, and there is
no evidence that communal harvesting served as insurance. Rather, equity (ensuring all
members of the community could pay their tax), political considerations, and, most sig-
nificantly, the costs of maintaining private property relative to those of monitoring col-
lective harvesting drove the adoption of imachi nkwu.4 The Igbo implemented collec-
tive palm-cutting in relatively small, homogenous communities, using already-existing
institutions of local governance. Difficulties in defining the boundaries both of private
groves and those areas belonging to specific communities made this regulation more
difficult. Trade did not erode the commons.
While I look at one society, this study has broader implications. The court cases give
a window into how property rights are managed in poor rural communities. The basic
result is that common property can limit the costs of competing over natural resources.
If this competition becomes more intense as the value of the resource rises, common
property will become more attractive relative to private property, not less. This will be
true of any scheme that gives the broader community an interest in preserving the com-
munal arrangement. Here, the essential feature of Igbo society is that defense of prop-
erty was largely private. The result, then, is most relevant where state enforcement of
private property is weak. This is not true only of small agrarian communities, but of
many situations in developing countries (de Soto, 2003; Field, 2007). Finally, this case
will be most relevant to examples where it is simpler to monitor that resource extraction
has occurred, rather than where or how much. Applications would include fisheries
with a single harbor or forestry with a limited number of access roads.
In the next section, I provide background on Igbo history, land tenure, and the prac-
tice of imachi nkwu. In Section 3, I outline the model. In Section 4, I describe the pri-
mary sources I use to support the model. I then use these to show that the model is a
4Monitoring here refers to members of the community and, to a lesser extent, neighboring communities.
Protection of palm-groves from encroachment by in-migrants did not drive the adoption of communal
harvesting. Udo (1975, p. 69-71) stresses that most migrants who established themselves in Igbo territory
in order to harvest palm fruits did so in areas such as Ahoada and Nike that were less-densely settled,
or areas such as Asa, where “the oil palm receives little attention from the local male population which
concentrates on producing garri, a local staple from cassava, for sale to the nearby urban centres.” Udo
(1975, p. 126-137) does not list centralization of control of palm trees among the strategies adopted by
local communities for dealing with conflicts between themselves and migrants.
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good description of the larger palaver over palm cutting in colonial Igbo society. In Sec-
tion 5, I extend the model to include direct taxation and compare its predictions to the
primary sources. In Section 6, I conclude.
2. THE IGBO, PALM OIL, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
2.1. The Igbo. The Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria are the country’s third-largest ethnic
group. During the colonial period, they lived mostly in communities of a few hundred
to over two thousand persons (Gailey, 1970, p. 23). Authority was decentralized, with
power divided between the amala (village council), the Ezeala (Earth priest), umokpara
(the ofo-holders, or compound heads), the okonko secret society, and the age grades
(Oriji, 1991, p. 31-42). From roughly 1900 until 1929, British rule was carried out in
Igboland using a system of “warrant chiefs,” who sat as members of local Native Courts
(Afigbo, 1972). In 1928, annual poll taxes on adult males ranging from 4 shillings (s)
to 7s were introduced. Late in 1929, the “Women Riot” against taxation, the warrant
chiefs, the native courts and the depressed state of trade prompted reforms (Martin,
1988, p. 106). Native Courts were created, comprised in each village-group of a “massed
bench of elders,” while Native Authorities were established that included the eldest man
of each ezi (compound) and any young men they chose to co-opt (Martin, 1988, p. 121).
Records from these reformed Native Courts are the principal sources for this study.
Palm products were the most important Igbo exports during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, and the Igbo were leading suppliers of this produce (Lynn, 1997, p. 34).
Figure 1 gives prices and quantities in the palm oil trade between Britain and West Africa
from 1817 to 1939.5 The increase in nominal palm oil prices was not uninterrupted, but
the rise in Igbo purchasing power was persistent. The ratio of palm oil to cotton tex-
tile prices rose continuously over the nineteenth century (Allen, 2011). Palm trees were
rarely planted on purpose. One official estimated in 1907 that there were 6 palms per
acre in the vicinity of Aba (Martin, 1988, p. 46). Palm fruits could be harvested year-
round. Assessment Reports for five Native Court areas of the Aba and Bende Divisions
estimated that palm produce contributed between 1% and 51% of household income,
averaging 20%.6 In the Aba Native Court Area (NCA), for example, palm nuts were cut ev-
ery 24 days. On each occasion a man would cut approximately 5 heads of fruit – enough
to produce 3 tins of oil (worth 18s) and 400 lbs of kernels (worth£2/4/0) over the course
of a year (Abadist 9/1/1362).7
5Although time series for specific regions of West Africa are not readily available for the nineteenth cen-
tury, the bulk of this trade was from what later became Nigeria. Lynn (1997, p. 20) reports that roughly
80% of British palm oil imports in 1849-51 were from Biafran ports, and a further 5% came from the Bight
of Benin. No time series of local prices are available for the nineteenth century. Dike (1956, p. 50) states
that, while the price in Liverpool was roughly £28 per ton in 1832, the local price averaged £14, though it
could be as low as £5 in the less frequented rivers of the Niger Delta.
6Abadist files 8/11/2, 14/1/1077, 8/11/12, 9/1/1362, and 9/1/1362.
7The accuracy of these estimates should not be overstated. Gailey (1970, p. 91-93) outlines the difficulties
faced by the administrative officers in making their reports. Weir believed that other officials had grossly
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FIGURE 1. British Palm Oil Trade with West Africa, 1790-1939
Sources: Relative prices are from Allen (2011). Imports to 1898 are from Lynn (1997). Exports from 1906
are from Martin (1988) and Usoro (1974).
2.2. Property rights and imachi nkwu. With some exceptions, the “village group” or
“town” of four to five thousand people was usually the relevant landholding unit, and
was generally coextensive with the maximal patrilineage (Jones, 1949, p. 309). Despite
the principle of communal ownership, reasonably secure, permanent, and inheritable
rights to farmland were frequently owned by minor lineages and individuals (Jones,
1949, p. 314). Ofo-holders (compound heads) had exclusive control over okpara (an-
cestral) land, though in theory they acted only as “custodians” of these plots and could
not alienate them without consent of other members of the lineage.8
The rules governing trees were more varied. Leeming wrote in 1927 of the Asa NCA
that:
The nuts are collected upon different principles in different villages of this
area. In some there is a day definitely fixed upon which the village will col-
lect communally and competitively. In other villages no such rules exist
and people may collect where and when they will. In some cases the fruit
overestimated the value of palm produce due to the coexistence of communal and individually owned
trees and to the high proportions of trees not bearing fruit (Abadist 8/11/12).
8In the court records, groves on ancestral land are referred to using the terms okpulor, okpulor ika or
okpulo.
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of the trees in the immediate vicinity of the village is reserved for the older
people (Abadist 14/1/1077).9
Some general principles can, however, be identified. Trees surrounding compounds
were “household palms,” and were usually owned by individuals (Chubb, 1961, p. 49).
Where wild palms existed in groves, they were usually free to all members of a village,
though they were often left un-harvested (Chubb, 1961, p. 50). On farmland, it was ac-
tionable to enter a farm for the purpose of gathering palm nuts between the period
when it was cleared and when the harvest was reaped (Obi, 1963, p. 49). Where they
were scattered on farmland not presently under cultivation, palms were generally free
to anyone in the kinship group (Chubb, 1961, p. 51).
Northrup (1978, p. 187) argues that “communal” systems were retained by the Igbo in
response to the palm oil trade, but that these became “more closely regulated.” There
are two reasons why his interpretation does not fully describe the institutional change
that occurred. First, groups such as families and quarters that had exclusive rights to
certain trees surrendered them to the greater community when communal harvesting
was introduced. Second, specific individuals had individual claims to particular groves
that were weakened or dismissed entirely under communal harvesting.
Colonial and anthropological evidence suggests that many Igbo areas of southeast-
ern Nigeria responded to the export trade in palm produce during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries by limiting their recognition of the exclusive rights held by certain
individuals and lineages over palm trees. In their place, Igbo groups such as the Ngwa
enacted the practice of imachi nkwu, or communal palm-cutting.10 Allen noted it in
his Intelligence Report on the Ngwa (SP021 CSE 1/85/3708), as well as his unpublished
“Ngwa Customs,” which is quoted at length by Chubb (1961, p. 48-49):
As soon as the commercial value of palm-oil and kernels was appreciated
by the people, new regulations were formulated by the village councils
9See also Thomas (1913) and for evidence of variation in property rights over trees.
10The term itself comes from Chuku (2005, p. 51). The timing of events is claimed by Allen in both his
unpublished “Ngwa Customs” and his Intelligence Report on the Ngwa (SP021 CSE 1/85/3708), with sup-
porting evidence offered by Chubb (1961), Obi (1963), Bridges (1938) and Green (1941). Allen’s intelli-
gence report, p. 33, states that “when palm oil began to assume a commercial value it was felt that a poor
man with little land would reap little profit therefrom while the income of the wealthier citizens would be
greatly augmented. This offended the communal spirit of the Ngwas, who therefore wisely ordained that
all of the oil palms in a village should become the property of the community, no matter who might be the
owner of the land on which they stood.” Thereafter, no one was to cut on communal trees expect on fixed
days, four times every three months. Falk (1920) is the only assertion I have found that the reverse was
true; whereas in the past palm trees had been open to all for cultivation, he claims that with population
growth harvesting rights became limited to members of the landowning family or compound. Mayne, by
mentioning regulated communal harvesting in his Assessment Report on the Umuahia Native Court Area
(Abadist 8/11/12) provides evidence that this predated the introduction of direct taxation.
The existence of common property in Igbo land tenure and palm harvesting is mentioned extensively
in anthropological and legal work by both Igbo and white authors. It appears in the assessment reports
and in the Native Court records. There is no evidence that the existence of these communal aspects are a
fiction invented under colonial rule, however they may have been modified by it.
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to control the taking of produce from communal trees. Gradually these
regulations were tightened up until at the present time strict laws exist
governing the ownership of all palm trees in a community. The majority
of palm trees in a village are now reserved for the community, no matter
whether they are of natural growth or have been planted by an individ-
ual... In order that each member of the community shall receive an equal
benefit, and to prevent deterioration of the trees through continual cut-
ting, a certain day is set apart generally once in 20 days, when every mem-
ber of the community may cut as much produce as he desires. On this
day a drum (Nkwa Nkwu) is beaten... This drum is in the care of an elder
of the village, who is specially selected for this duty by the village coun-
cil. Until this drum has been beaten any member of the community who
takes produce from communal palm trees is guilty of an offence for which
he may be fined one goat, or the equivalent of £1 by the village council.
Since the introduction of general tax this system has been extended to in-
clude trees which in ordinary circumstances are privately owned. At the
commencement of tax collection an order is promulgated by the village
council to the effect that for a specific period, generally three months, the
ownership of all private palm trees will be vested in the community.
Similar institutions were employed by the Aro, in Umuahia, and in other densely pop-
ulated areas of Owerri Province (Chubb (1961, p. 49), Chuku (2005, p. 51)). This was not
sharecropping; in most cases, each individual would cut on his own behalf during these
days. There were, however, instances where the revenues could be used for communal
purposes.
Allen explains imachi nkwu as a result of the palm oil trade and the “communal spirit”
of the Igbo. Green (1941) adds taxes to this explanation. She conducted fieldwork dur-
ing 1935 and 1937 at Umueke Agbaja, in the south of Okigwi Division. While she found
little land was left under group control, rights over palms were in a state of ambigu-
ity, fluctuating between “restriction of rights to those who owned the land on which
the palms stood and the extension of rights to anyone to cut anywhere” (Green, 1941,
p. 17). She was told that, in the past, people had restricted cutting palm nuts to trees on
their own land, but during a period when the population dwindled, it had been decided
that individuals could harvest anywhere within Umueke (Green, 1941, p. 18). After the
population recovered, cutting was once more limited to land of one’s own lineage. The
eldest man in the village had been instrumental in passing the restriction. He had many
trees on his land, and lacked the vigor to compete with youth in harvesting (Green, 1941,
p. 17). She was told that the rule had been passed because “the strongest people cut to
the detriment of the less strong,” and because of the introduction of the head tax. Some
landowners who could not climb found others harvesting from trees on their land, but
found these others unwilling to help them pay their own tax. By 1937, the youth of the
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village had successfully challenged the rule, forcing the elders to accept an “interme-
diate” position between the two extremes of communal and private rights over palms
(Green, 1941, p. 19).
3. MODEL
3.1. Setup. There are two players – one elderE and one youth Y . The elder possesses a
grove of trees that yield one unit of oil, which can be sold for a price of p. At the beginning
of the game, the elder chooses between private property and communal property. If
the elder chooses communal property, he also chooses what share θ of the oil he will
offer the youth before the game begins. This is done subject to the constraint that he
leaves the youth as well off under communal property as under private property. The
purpose of this model is to demonstrate that, under reasonable conditions that fit those
of the case under study, an increase in the price of palm oil can lead the elder to prefer
communal property to private property, leaving the youth no worse off.
Under either property regime, the game has one stage. The elder chooses a level of
costly monitoring, defending his grove against theft. Simultaneously, the youth chooses
how much effort to expend in stealing. Under private property, the youth directs his
efforts towards the entire grove. Under communal property, he only attempts to steal
from the fraction 1 − θ of the oil that he would not otherwise receive as his communal
share.
3.2. Private property. I begin by discussing outcomes under private property. The el-
der chooses his level of monitoring m > 0. This costs him dm, where d > 0 is the elder’s
marginal cost of monitoring effort. The youth exerts effort s > 0 in stealing. The youth
faces a cost of stealing cs, and so c > 0 is his marginal cost of effort. The oil is shared ac-
cording to the amount of effort expended. That is, the youth receives a share s
m+s
, while
the elder receives a share m
m+s
.
The elder’s problem can be written as:
(1) V PE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
p− dm
}
,
while the youth’s problem can be written as:
(2) V PY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
Both (1) and (2) are concave, and so they can be maximized from their first-order
conditions. The elder’s best response, then, is:
(3) mPBR = max
{√
sp
d
− s, 0
}
,
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while the youth’s best response is:
(4) sPBR = max
{√
mp
c
−m, 0
}
.
Substituting (3) into (4) gives equilibrium levels of monitoring and theft:
(5) mP∗ =
(
c
c+ d
)2
p
c
,
and
(6) sP∗ =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p
d
.
Substituting (5) and (6) into (1) and (2) gives the equilibrium payoffs under private
property:
(7) V PE =
(
c
c+ d
)2
p,
and
(8) V PY =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p.
3.3. Communal harvesting. Under communal property, the elder begins by offering a
share θ of the oil to the youth. He is willing to do this because the costs of monitoring
under communal property are lower, for reasons outlined above. In particular, his mar-
ginal cost of monitoring is now γ, where d > γ > 0. It is assumed he can commit to θ;
in practice, youth harvested their own share. Communal property, however, also entails
a fixed administrative cost of k¯. This captures the cost of organizing and overseeing the
harvest according to a set schedule of days.11
Thus, taking θ as given, the elder’s problem can be written as:
(9) V CE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯
}
,
while the youth’s problem can be written as:
11Without k¯, the elder’s payoff under communal property will still rise relative to his payoff under private
property as p rises. k¯ ensures that a rise in the price of oil will induce a switch; without k¯, communal
property would be preferred for any p so long as the elder can choose θ. Without this assumption, the
widening gap between the elder’s payoff under communal and private property could be used to explain
a transition from private property to communal property in response to rising prices if, instead, an initial
state of private property and switching costs were assumed.
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(10) V CY = max
s
{
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs
}
.
Again, (9) and (10) are concave, and can be solved from their first order conditions.
The elder’s best response, then, is:
(11) mCBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
γ
− s, 0
}
,
while the youth’s best response is:
(12) sCBR = max
{√
m(1− θ)p
c
−m, 0
}
.
Conditional on θ, (11) can be substituted into (12) to give equilibrium levels of moni-
toring and theft:
(13) mC∗ =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p
c
,
and
(14) sC∗ =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p
γ
.
Substituting (13) and (14) into (9) and (10) gives the equilibrium payoffs under com-
munal property, conditional on θ:
(15) V CE =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p− k¯,
and
(16) V CY = θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p.
Given these conditional payoffs, the elder will choose the minimum θ that satisfies
the youth’s participation constraint that V CY ≥ V PY . In particular, he will choose:
(17) θC∗ =
(
d
c+d
)2 − ( γ
c+γ
)2
1−
(
γ
c+γ
)2 .
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Substituting θC∗ into (15) and (16) gives equilibrium payoffs under communal prop-
erty:
(18) V CE =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
c+ 2d
c+ 2γ
)
p− k¯,
and
(19) V CY =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p.
3.4. Commercialization. The elder will prefer communal property when V CE ≥ V PE .
From (7) and (18), this is equivalent to stating that he will prefer communal property
when:
(20) p ≥
(
c+ d
c
)2(
c+ 2γ
2(d− γ)
)
k¯.
That (20) is a positive cutoff for p follows directly from the assumption that d > γ.
This is the main result of the model: a rise in the price of palm oil can induce the elder
to switch to communal property in order to reduce monitoring costs, leaving the youth
no worse off. If the elder is unable to choose θ, then a similar cutoff rule applies only if θ
is sufficiently small (see Appendix A.1). Otherwise, the elder will never prefer communal
property.
3.5. Other responses. Communal harvesting need not be the only option elders had
available to cope with the rising costs of monitoring under private property. Why did
they not respond by cooperating in their defense of private property, manipulating the
village council in order to more cheaply protect their rights, or simply pay the youth to
harvest for them?
Cooperativemonitoring by the elders would be one possible alternative to communal
harvesting. I extend the model to include this possibility in Appendix A.2. There are
two points to consider. First, cooperative monitoring would have entailed a collective
action problem. When monitoring is a public good, it will be under-provided. Whereas
youths would have a direct interest in protecting their communal share from theft, other
property owners had no direct interest in each other’s property. The extension in the
Appendix shows that this effort would only be provided if it were individually rational
for each elder. A related difficulty not captured by the extension in Appendix A.2 is that
private monitoring might create negative externalities, as youth divert their efforts at
theft towards less-secure plots. This would force all elders to monitor more intensively
than if these spill-overs did not exist.
Second, there is no reason to treat cooperative monitoring as an alternative to com-
munal harvesting; cooperative monitoring could equally be used to defend private and
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communal tenure. The extension in Appendix A.2 allows for this. With cooperative
monitoring possible under both private and communal property, the switch to com-
munal property is again occasioned by an increase in the price.
Judicialmanipulation would have been self defeating. The village council was used to
settle many disputes aside from palm harvesting. Traditionally, the village council gave
orders for cleaning paths, regulated prices, and dealt with both economic and “minor
judicial” matters, including issues arising within a single family or age grade (SP 021 CSE
1/85/3708). Damaging its credibility in this case would have made it less useful in other
instances, especially as the village council did not have a monopoly over dispute reso-
lution (SP 021 CSE 1/85/3708). Further, if the standard of proof were lowered artificially,
punishments meted out by the village council would have become more arbitrary, and
would not have been effective deterrents.
Wage labor was problematic for several reasons. I model one of these in Appendix
A.2 – any worker employed to harvest oil for the elder would need to be monitored, in
order to prevent him from keeping any oil for himself. Where the technology of theft
and monitoring by a hired youth is the same as in the case with private property, I show
in Appendix A.2 that the elder can indeed do no better paying a wage than he can by
defending his own property. Similar difficulties would face an elder who attempted to
hire a youth to monitor for him. In addition, the wage paid to the youth would have to
be made sufficiently high in order to elicit monitoring effort. I show in Appendix A.2
that the youth’s monitoring costs would need to be low relative to the elder’s costs for
this to be profitable for the elder.
There are additional difficulties with wage labor not captured by this extension. Belle-
mare and Barrett (2003) suggest that giving too large a share of a resource to a tenant can
create a risk of expropriation; elders may have feared that giving up symbolic control of
the harvest would have led to them losing control of their palms altogether. I give ex-
amples below where control of palms was politically valuable. Further, the timing of
this payment presented a problem. Either elders would have to pay youth out of cash
reserves prior to the harvest, or payment in cash afterwards would create the possibility
of a hold up problem.
Further, wage labor was rare in Igbo society in before the Second World War. What
wage labor did exist by the end of the colonial period was largely migrant and seasonal
(Uchendu, 1965, p. 32). Martin (1988, p. 87-88) notes that, during the early twentieth
century, “[m]arriage rather than contractual wage relationships continued to be the
mainstay of labor recruitment.” Hired labor was a minor component of the labor supply
in pre-colonial Igboland. Slaves, age mates, and clientelist relationships remained im-
portant means of labor recruitment through the first half of the century (Brown, 2003,
p. 38).
3.6. Other considerations. The model above abstracts away from altruism, observabil-
ity, credibility of punishment, and Igbo seniority structures.
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Adding altruism has the power to change the results. I extend the model to include
this in Appendix A.3. It is not tractable to add fairness or reciprocity in the form sug-
gested by Rabin (1993), and so I only discuss these related concepts informally. If both
the elder and youth take each other’s material payoffs into account, it improves out-
comes for both players, since monitoring and stealing are both reduced. If altruism is
symmetric, this does not affect the material division of the oil, but does reduce the costs
of both monitoring and theft. This improvement occurs under both private and com-
munal property. Now that the youth cares about the fixed costs of common property
k¯, the elder’s offer of θ is conditional on the price of oil. This, along with the addition
of the youth’s material payoffs to the elder’s objective function, implies that the elder’s
preference for communal over private property is no longer necessarily equivalent to a
price cutoff.
Adding reciprocity, the tendency to “reward kind actions and punish unkind ones”
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), would strengthen the case for common property. In pub-
lic goods games, altruistic types will generally punish free riders, encouraging greater
contributions (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Reciprocity would have two effects. First, while
I have not modeled monitoring by the youth under common property, reciprocity would
sustain greater aggregate monitoring than self-interest alone. This would reduce the re-
turns to effort in theft, reinforcing the tendency for common property to become more
attractive as the price rises. In addition, a youth motivated by reciprocity will view a
relatively high offer of θ as “kind,” and reciprocate by lowering his effort in theft. This
will make common property more rewarding to the elder, as it would partially offset the
cost of an increase in θ, a benefit that would also rise with the price.
Adding observability would add little to the model. The sharing rule s
s+m
could be
interpreted as the probability that the youth steals successfully. The model excludes
punishment. The evidence below, however, makes it clear that thieves were sometimes
taken before the village council. If punishment is costly, repeated interaction is needed
to make it credible. Credibility would be greater under common property, because the
greater number of potential witnesses and lower burden of proof reduced the costs of
proving a case (see below). In addition, in experimental public goods games that re-
semble the common property scenario, individuals will punish bad behavior, even if
it is costly, provides them no material benefits, and is not observed (Carpenter, 2007;
Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003).
Finally, the seniority structure of Igbo society has complex effects. I extend the model
to include seniority in Appendix A.3, using a repeated game. The possibility of becoming
an elder and acquiring trees of his own can be used to encourage secure the youth’s
respect for private property. If the youth is sufficiently patient, and the share θ offered to
him under common property is small, then increases in θ can be used to encourage his
adherence to common property, even if he cannot be made to respect private property.
If θ is sufficiently large, however, this has the perverse effect of making the position of
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an elder less enviable, weakening the usefulness of the possibility of promotion as a tool
to secure the youth’s cooperation.
Colonial rule disrupted the Igbo seniority structure, giving youth outside options be-
yond their communities and changed the rules of the political hierarchy, weakening
youths’ incentives to observe community rules. This helps explain examples in the court
records where common property arrangements had collapsed, and where elders’ au-
thority is questioned. This pattern is not unique to Igbo society. The Israeli kibbutzim,
for example, use shared ideology and a loss of wealth on exit to give their members rea-
sons to stay for the long term (Abramitzky, 2008).
4. EVIDENCE
In this section, I present archival evidence on Igbo palm harvesting. I use this for two
purposes. First, these sources contain descriptive material not found in other accounts.
They provide detail on the administration, defense, and evolution of property rights in
a very poor country. Second, these can be used to show that the mechanisms stressed
in the model were those that drove the evolution of property rights. I note that conflicts
over palm harvesting in Igbo society largely pit elders against youths as interest groups,
that defense of property rights was costly, particularly when palms were private, and
that “communal” harvesting was used to restrict the effort costs associated with har-
vesting and monitoring.
The evidence, then, supports the assumptions of the model rather than its predic-
tions. This is due to the nature of the evidence. The change to communal harvesting
predates anthropological observations, and is observed only in the retrospective oral
testimony cited above. Where observable transitions to communal harvesting occur in
the court records, they came about in a world of Native Courts and direct taxation –
evidence supporting the implications of this extension are discussed in Section 5.
4.1. Sources. The primary sources I use are from the National Archives of Nigeria at
Enugu. These fall into three categories:
(1) Native Court Records: A selection of Civil Judgment Books from the Aba-Na-
Ohazu (ANO), Nkwo Udara (NU),12 Obohia (ONC), and Ugba (UNC) Native Courts
were used based on their availability. These are the principal sources for this
study.13
(2) CSE : Central Secretary’s Office, Nigeria, 1906-1940. This contains a variety of
correspondence, including Intelligence Reports.
12This series contains judgments from the Mvosi (MGC), Ovuku (OVU), Ovuoko (OVO), and Ovokwu
(OVW) Group Courts.
13Citations of these cases are abbreviated for legibility. For example, Nkwo Udara civil suit 140 of 1935 is
cited as NU 140/35
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(3) Abadist : This series contains documents and correspondence relating to Aba Di-
vision, including Assessment Reports. Land dispute records in these files gener-
ally contain facsimiles of the relevant court proceedings as well as petitions to
colonial officials about the judgments rendered and correspondence between
officials concerning these cases. A sample from this series has been included in
the Web Appendix.14
The Native Court records that are available date mostly from the 1930s and later;
Afigbo (1972) and Adewoye (1977) outline the history of these courts. These are rough
transcripts handwritten in English by the court clerk during proceedings. Each record
begins by stating the names and home villages of the plaintiffs and defendants; in cases
involving violations of palm-cutting regulations, it is not uncommon to see more than
ten defendants in a single case. The statement of grievance and any claim for damages
are also given. Parties make statements and call witnesses. Cross-examination by the
opposing party and the court is common. Cases are often adjourned for further wit-
nesses, inspection of the land, or swearing of juju.15 The court’s decision is recorded,
along with any statement by the president.
4.2. Intergenerational conflict.
4.2.1. Evidence. As in the model, the key participants in palm harvesting disputes were
elders who exercised control of palm groves. This split can be found both in the lan-
guage of the court cases and in the substantive facts behind them. Elders tell the court
that laws are passed “for the young ones to stop cutting the palm nuts” (NU 195/37),
claim damages for “cutting the elders’ palm nuts” (OGC 405/35), and sue as the de-
fendants’ “father” (UNC 62/35) or as “the elder” (NU 55/25). Defendants might sim-
ilarly use terms such as “father” to refer to their accusers (UNC 115/35). The facts of
these cases show a similar division. A typical civil suit over palm harvesting in the court
records involves an elder, either alone or on behalf of the amala (village council), bring-
ing action against a youth or group of youths either for trespass on a private okpulor
(private grove) or for violating the village’s rules concerning communal palm-cutting.
Youth would coordinate their efforts in theft, in order to mis-inform the amala (village
council) (UNC 115/35).
4.2.2. Stakes. The model emphasizes the distinction between elders and youths on the
basis of their differing endowments of resources. Evidence already cited above shows
that palm oil was of prime economic importance to the Igbo, and could contribute a
meaningful portion of a man’s yearly income. In addition, elders and youth differed in
14Specifically, this is Abadist 9/1/268. I was not able to copy a sample native court case from the National
Archives in Enugu, since these are contained in bound volumes, but the transcript of Umuaro Native
Court Civil Suit 283/33 contained in this record is of the same format as the cases in these books.
15An object supposed to have magical properties, or the power associated with it. The word is of Hausa
origin.
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their demands for cash. Green (1941, p. 18) reported that the young men of Umueke, in
their dealings with the elders, had outlined these pressures:
if the [elders] had refused to concede what they wanted they would have
seized their cows and sheep and sold them, since they must live somehow.
As [her informant] said, it is all very well for the old men, they have all got
wives, but the young ones have still to get together bride price to marry
theirs and they need palm oil to sell (Green, 1941, p. 18).
These generational conflicts were not only economic. They were also contests over
political power. Whether palm trees were harvested communally or privately, control
over them was a tool with which to wield political authority. Leeming reported that a
common privilege of office for headmen and ezealas (Earth priests) in the Aba NCA was
that certain days would be set aside for townsmen to cut and collect palm kernel heads
while clearing the brush for the headman’s farm (Abadist 9/1/1362). Oriji (2007) argues
that these privileges were a consequence of the taboos needed to maintain the sacred-
ness of authority in Igbo society. Since the ezealas (earth priests) and okparas (elders)
were not permitted to engage in mundane economic activities, they were dependent on
tribute. Elders in the court records make similar claims. One argued that all family land,
jujus, and palm nuts had been vested in him (NU 313/38). Another claimed monopoly
over all palm groves as the eldest man (OVW 11/37).
Control of palms could be used as leverage. In one case, the elders found themselves
unable to evict a man from their village for incest and adultery; instead they fined him
£1 and denied him the right to cut palm fruits until this was repaid (NU 115/35). As
political authority was diffused outside the amala (village council), other interests also
exercised social control through regulation of palm cutting. In some villages, the okonko
(secret society) had days specifically reserved for its members to harvest. In one suit,
the defendant claimed that he had left the okonko (secret society) after converting to
Christianity and had since been denied any rights over communal palms (NU 118/35).
The political value of this control helps explain why the elders attempted to settle
disputes before the amala (village council) before taking cases to the Native Court. For
example, in NU 55/25, the case was only brought to court after the defendant had been
summoned to the amala (village council) by his father, but had refused to come. In
another case, the plaintiff told the court that if the defendant had come to “beg” the
amala (village council), no action would have been taken in court (NU 55/35). Often,
at least one defendant had already settled in the amala (village council) before the case
reached court, weakening the position of the other defendants who refused to do so
(ANO 244/41, UNC 132/38, OVO 148/36). Those who refused to settle outside of court
could be given additional fines for their recalcitrance (OVO 148/36).
By keeping control of the communal harvest, elders held on to symbolic authority.
One witness informed the court that the elders of his community inspected the villagers
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before cutting began (NU 256/35). Similarly, violations of harvesting rules were inter-
preted as signs of disrespect. One plaintiff, accused of having cut fruit on a day reserved
for elders, was described by the plaintiff as a youth who “respects no elder” (NU 140/35).
In his own defense, the defendant claimed that he had paid the dues necessary to be-
come an elder, but had not been permitted to join the amala (village council).
4.3. The costs of defending property. The court records provide evidence of the costs
of maintaining private rights over trees. In addition to the direct effort in monitor-
ing, property owners had to prove points of fact and points of law in an environment
where this was difficult. Although communal harvesting also required administration
and monitoring, evidence from the court cases shows that this was simpler than what
was needed under private property.
4.3.1. Private property. Landowners often had to depend on their own kin to detect
violators. One of the plaintiff’s witnesses told the court that it was his children who
had caught the defendant (Abadist 9/1/794: Mbutu Umu Ujima Group Court Civil Suit
142/35). In the sample of court cases, there is no evidence of cooperative defense of
private property.
Even when a thief was caught infringing on rights of private property, enforcing judg-
ment was costly, as it was difficult to prove facts. Factual disputes most commonly cen-
tered around the boundaries on which the trees stood (e.g. MGC 222/36). Proving facts
before the amala (village council) and in the Native Court required either witnesses or
oathing. A party who failed to bring supporting witnesses could lose on this ground
alone (ONC 713/21). A witness might not be enough; in one case, the reviewing officer
only accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness because one of the defendants had
contradicted his own story (MGC 256/35). Physical evidence was of no use; the plaintiff
of one dispute brought to court one bunch of nuts he alleged had been cut by the de-
fendant, but it would have been impossible from these to tell who had harvested them
and from what tree (UNC 199/38). Inspection of the land by the court was possible, but
also costly and potentially indeterminate.
Even with witnesses, oaths were frequently used to prove facts. In one case, the plain-
tiff was given judgment in the native court when he offered to swear on a Bible, but
the defendants refused to provide one. The case was later reopened, and an inspection
revealed that the defendants had in fact harvested from their own trees, and that the
plaintiff had been motivated by malice (NU 217/38). Fear of supernatural punishment
was not sufficient to induce truth-telling. The plaintiff of one suit accused the defendant
and his people from going to the maker of the juju they had sworn on, paying him to re-
move its power (Abadist 9/1/26: Omuma Civil Suit 25/29). Other litigants feared that
their opponents, given the opportunity to swear falsely, would do so (Abadist 14/1/504:
Arungwa and Amavor Group Court Suit 81/35).
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Points of law were equally pernicious for landowners attempting to defend their rights.
The claim that palms were harvested communally was a common defence (e.g. NU
154/35). Some of these assertions were outright lies. A plaintiff might try to cover his
theft from a private grove by telling the court that his community’s palm trees were
communal (OVO 318/36). In some instances, however, the customary law was actu-
ally unclear. The young defendant in one case asked the court to decide whether he had
the right to trees that had been planted by his father on land that had been pledged to
his father. The court had to adjourn to consult elders on this point (NU 610/37). Fur-
ther, the procedure for redress was complicated by the diffusion of political authority, as
disputes could be alternately settled before the amala (village council), by the okonko
(secret society), inside the ezi (compound), within the age-grade, or with the help of the
oke amadi, the wealthy members of the community who Allen labeled “the true de facto
rulers of the village” (SP 021 CSE 1/85/3708).
The Native Courts added an extra layer to this complexity and made their own proce-
dural demands. Plaintiffs who had taken a criminal action might be told to start afresh
with a civil suit (UNC 150/35). Political concerns also interfered with the working of the
Native Courts. In one dispute, the District Officer ordered that the proceedings from an
earlier and related case be read to the court. The plaintiff, writing for an appeal, com-
plained that this had not been done, because the court clerk would have been afraid to
read this judgment in front of the sitting chiefs (Abadist 9/1/26: Umuma Native Court
Civil Suit 35/29).
4.3.2. Common property. This is not to imply that regulation of effort when palm trees
were harvested communally was costless. Some of the same difficulties in proving facts
and negotiating the Native Court system would have applied to communal harvesting.
One of the greatest sources of difficulty was ambiguity in the law. In some cases, one
side will claim that common harvesting was practiced, while the other party will deny
it (e.g. OVW 35/37). A court unable to discern which claim was true might resort to the
swearing of juju (NU 42/35).
These ambiguities might be the product of a longer history of negotiation about prop-
erty rights. In one example, the palms under dispute were owned in common by four
towns, while both privately and commonly owned trees coexisted. Twelve years before,
the plaintiffs’ elders had made regulations concerning the use of these trees. They had
killed a goat to mark the occasion, but the meat had been refused by the defendants’
elders, who did not inform their youth of what had occurred. The youth, then, had no
means of knowing what the rules were (UNC 49/35).
Collective action is made easier when the users of a natural resource are similar to
each other. In cases where several quarters attempted to enact communal harvesting
together or where other social conflicts intervened, co-operation would at times break
down. For example, the community of Umueteghbe decided after repeated offenses
against the communal harvesting regulations to no longer cut together, each onumara
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(quarter) keeping instead to its own land (NU 243/35). In another case, the amala (vil-
lage council) had decided that each compound should cut separately after a violent dis-
pute between the members of different compounds. Another witness in the same case,
however, noted that regulations were still enacted to restrict harvesting during the time
when tax payments came due (NU 192/27).
4.3.3. Relative costs. Where the rules were clear, monitoring under common property
need only detect that a violation had occurred, not on whose land, and could be effected
by any member of the village. Whereas defense of private property was a largely private
act, maintaining the rules of communal harvesting was in the interest of the whole com-
munity. This is the critical distinction between the costs of monitoring under private
and communal property in the model; while under private property the costs of moni-
toring rise with the price of oil, they do not rise as quickly under communal harvesting.
The costs of maintaining private property could, as in the model above, be such that
a regulated communal harvesting arrangement was preferred. The participants in one
dispute explicitly told the court that they had united together in palm cutting because
harvesting had led them to go to court too often (NU 111/37).
The mechanics of communal harvesting provided other advantages that simplified
monitoring. The witnesses one case indicated that they gathered together before har-
vesting; this would make supervision easier (NU 256/35). The rigid schedule of com-
munal harvesting also eased monitoring. One violator had been caught when a villager
noticed that a tree had been cut before the wooden bell had been rung. Cutting was
halted until the perpetrator was found (Abadist 13/8/50: Aba Native Court Civil Suit
10/24). In another case, the amala (village council) had found the party guilty of violat-
ing the communal harvesting rules by making everyone swear juju and prosecuting the
man who refused (OVO 148/36). There were also positive spillovers across communi-
ties; the witnesses in one case knew to lie in wait to see if the neighboring community
were tresspassing on their land when their neigbors rung a bell to signal that communal
cutting had begun (Abadist 9/1/268: Umuaro Native Court Civil Suit 283/33).16
4.4. Communal harvesting: variations on effort restriction. Communal harvesting
was, above all, a means to restrict effort expended in harvesting palm oil. Those com-
munities that practiced imachi nkwu attempted to maintain strict controls over when
and how their members could cut. While reaping palm fruit did not cause permanent
damage to the trees, the village stock of palms was like a fishery insofar as the gather-
ing of fruits by some individuals could leave others without the means to pay tax when it
came due. Where there were restrictions, specific days were set aside at regular intervals
during which individuals could cut palm fruits at will. The beginning of the communal
harvest was signalled by the beating of a drum, and cutting when it had not been rung
was punishable by a fine.
16This case is included in the Web Appendix.
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Within these broad outlines, regulations differed by village. In some villages, the men
had been divided into two groups, each with separate turns (NU 284/37). Some vil-
lages ceased completely to recognize private rights over trees while others did not. The
defendant in one suit listed for the court some individuals who had once held private
rights to Okpulor [private] palm trees before the community had decided to deprive
them of these (MGC 161/36). Consistent with the interpretation that these restrictions
were imposed to reduce the negative externalities of harvest effort, some villages per-
mitted cutting to be suspended if a resident were under arrest or away at court (ANO
281/38).
Whether individuals could hire helpers or sell their own turns varied. Mayne noted
that among the northern Ohuhu of the Umuahia NCA, those individuals who could
hire the greatest number of laborers from neighboring towns collected the most fruit
(Abadist 8/11/12). In the village of Umuoke-nnunu, people were permitted to sell their
turns, as was revealed when one of the defendants of one case was charged with selling
his turn to each of the three other defendants at once (ANO 308/42). The defendant in
another suit claimed that hiring of up to three reapers was permitted at Umuejea. Al-
though the plaintiff disputed this assertion, he took action against the defendant, and
not against the man to whom the defendant had sold his turn, and who had sold his
harvest to the plaintiff’s wife (NU 82/35). At Ndiegora, a stranger living in the town was
brought to court because, on the orders of his host, he joined the community in harvest-
ing, despite having been warned to go to his own town for this (ANO 109/41). Similarly,
at Umumkpakara Mkpuru it was said that a person who hired an additional person was
made to pay a fine. The defendant in a case from this village claimed that he had hired
a man to cut nuts for his brother who was away at school, but the plaintiffs protested
that he should have called a boy to cut, as an adult should not called to cut in place of a
young boy (ANO 167/43). Together, these examples show the varied strategies commu-
nities used to limit harvesting effort while maintaining an appearance of legitimacy and
equity.
5. DIRECT TAXATION
Green (1941) suggests that direct taxation under colonial rule intensified the conflict
between elders and youth over palm harvesting, leading to communal harvesting in
places where it had not already existed. Taxes also help explain why communal harvest-
ing persisted, despite low interwar prices of palm oil. Suppose now that the youth must
pay a tax of τ from the sale of palm oil, so that he faces the constraint s
m+s
p > τ . If this
is binding, it implies that his optimal effort does not yield enough oil to pay the tax, and
so he will invest only enough effort to just meet this constraint, i.e.:
(21) sTAX =
τd
p− τ .
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This will be the case when sTAX > sPBR, or:
(22)
τd
p− τ ≥
√
pm
c
−m⇒ m ≥ (p− τ)
2
pc
≡ m(τ).
This will occur if the elder’s preferred level of defense mP∗ is greater than m(τ):
(23)
(
c
c+ d
)2
p
c
≥ (p− τ)
2
pc
⇒ τ ≥ c
c+ d
p.
Substituting the youth’s constrained best response function sTAX into (1) allows us to
rewrite the elder’s problem as:
(24) V TAXE = max
m
m
sTAX +m
p− dm = p− τ − dm.
This simply restates the fact that, once the youth’s tax constraint is binding, the el-
der can receive no more than p − τ from the plot, since any additional defensive effort
will be offset in its benefits through increased stealing by the youth. He will therefore
not choose m > m(τ). Since his optimal effort below m(τ) is unchanged, his reaction
function becomes:
(25) mTAX = min
{(
c
c+ d
)2
p
c
,
(p− τ)2
pc
}
.
The model predicts then, that the imposition of a head tax on the youth will lead the
elder to limit his defensive effort, knowing that he cannot keep the youth from stealing.
Qualitatively, this will be similar to a common property regime in which θ = p/τ . Re-
ducing monitoring in order to let the youth steal is, like communal harvesting, another
mechanism by which the elder chooses to self-interestedly cede his property rights.
Poll taxes were introduced in Igboland in 1928, in order to bolster the power of the
Warrant Chiefs through the creation of Native Treasuries (Afigbo, 1966; Gailey, 1970).
The heart of disputes over palms was that they were a valuable source of cash income
that could be used to pay tax. Usoro (1974, p. 60) makes a rough estimation17 that 20%
of the value of palm oil exported in 1931 was collected as tax. At the time taxes were
introduced, the value of the tax was roughly equivalent to one four-gallon tin of oil,
though this physical burden doubled within a year due to falling prices (Martin, 1988,
p. 113-117). Where palm oil was harvested privately, the receipts were put to uses for
which cash was similarly necessary; the defendant in one case told the court that he
had harvested palms to pay his younger brother’s school fees (ANO 167/43). In another
suit, one party had pledged an okpulor ika (private grove) belonging to the ofo-holder
17 0.25 adult males per person X 2,563,148 taxable population in the palm oil belt X 7/6 tax per adult male
£10.28 per ton estimated producer price X 118,133 tons exported = 19.9%
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on behalf of the onumara (quarter) in order to pay the collective fine levied after the
Women Riot (OVU 461/36).
It was difficult for youth to pay their taxes by means other than palm harvesting. Allen
wrote that palm produce was the only means of obtaining cash with which to pay tax
or purchase imports. There is little indication in either the literature or archival sources
how individuals that did not have access to palm produce or paid employment were able
to meet their tax obligations. Afigbo (1966, p. 551) writes that, when taxation proposals
were discussed with the Igbo, district officers were asked if they would prosecute people
who pawned their children to pay the tax. It is clear that men did pawn themselves to
pay tax (Afigbo, 1966, p. 553), and that women sometimes had to use their savings to
pay their husbands’ tax the first year it was collected (Gailey, 1970, p. 98).
Even where there was no conversion from private to communal property, the intro-
duction of direct taxation increased the incentive for youth without groves of their own
to steal. Based on her own fieldwork, Green (1941, p. 19) argues that “anything tend-
ing to increase the need for money – the introduction of tax, the increasing demand
for European clothing, for schooling and so on” made the definition of rights over trees
more important and contentious, by raising the value of these rights. The defendant in
one case admitted that the plaintiff owned the trees from which he had harvested and
accepted his contentions that private groves belonged to the eldest man in the family
and that it was not lawful for any other person to harvest from them. Even still, he had
reaped from these trees because he had no other means of paying the tax (UNC 17/39).
In several court cases the communal controls imposed on palm cutting are stated di-
rectly by witnesses to have been linked to the payment of tax. In one example, a witness
stated that the palms had been reserved for paying tax (UNC 62/35). In another, the
plaintiff stated that a rule had been made four weeks previously that no-one was to cut
palm fruits until notice was given. This would allow the fruits to ripen and yield enough
oil for the payment of tax (OVU 418/35).
The difficulty of enforcing regulations made when palms were made communal for
tax payment is a persistent theme of the court records. If regulations were violated too
often, the restrictions might become ignored (OVO 440/36) or “spoilt” (OVU 66/36). If
this occurred, attempts could be made to renew the restrictions; the occasion could be
marked with a symbolic act such as the sacrifice of a goat (OVU 418/35).
One difficulty not captured by the model is that of hold-out. Lone individuals might
resist the conversion of their groves to common property for the purpose of tax pay-
ments. In one case, “the villagers” had asked all individuals who held palm trees on
pledge to leave these to ripen, so that the amala (village council) could set them aside
for general use. The defendant had objected, stating that he refused to give over his
palm fruits so that others could pay their tax. The court found in his favor (UNC 35/39).
Others were less successful. In one suit, the eldest man of his village had been forced by
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the young men to join what he called a “tax meeting.” When he hired two men to cut
palm fruits from his trees, he had been fined 10s (MGC 161/36).
These conflicts were a challenge for colonial officials. The British depended on elders
in order to project power at the local level, and so tried to protect their authority. Allow-
ing elders too much exclusive control of palm groves, however, made it more difficult to
collect tax revenue and created disaffection among youth. Officials, then, also limited
elders’ accumulation of property. The aims of Indirect Rule and the means of funding it
pulled the men on the spot in opposite directions.
These contradictions are clearly evident in two cases – UNC 89/38 and OVO 344/36.
In the first case, the plaintiff had ceased to allow the young men to harvest fruit from
his trees after he did not receive his share of the 10% rebate of tax revenues paid by
the colonial government as compensation for assistance in tax-collection. By his own
estimation, this would have been 15s. The defendants were then compelled to borrow
money to pay their taxes. When their creditors troubled them, they gathered oil from
the fruits on his land. The plaintiff protested:
I told them that my father never told me that one could take one’s palm
trees by force, and that we use to appear in open square and pass a rule
that the owners of the palm trees should allow young men to cut nuts for
tax.
One witness told the court that the British officer had instructed the young men to
meet with the elders in discussing these matters, but had also told the old men to limit
themselves to one private grove only. The court found for the plaintiff, deciding that he
should not be forced to surrender his palms and was free to carry on with his trees as he
wished.
In the second case, the elders of Umuakole had initially responded to the poll taxes
by arranging for a time during which young men could cut from private groves. The
arrangement had collapsed, and palms were being cut in common with no restrictions
on the time of harvest. A meeting was summonsed and juju administered that no one
should cut except on appointed days. The defendants in the case had not adhered to this
decision and forced their way into the plaintiff’s land. A tax demand note was then re-
ceived stating that 24 days remained until payment was due. The first defendant told the
court that a meeting was then held and cutting suspended in anticipation of the tax pay-
ment. The defendants, however, were annoyed that, of the eleven persons in Umuakole
with private palm groves, they believed only three were entitled to them. Further, the
plaintiff and others had, in their view, exceeded what their ancestors had. The court
initially found for the plaintiff, but on review the defendants were cautioned and dis-
charged. The reviewing officer noted that the elders had very strong views on the case.
They had claimed that, if the defendants were not punished, the young men would get
out of control. Nonetheless, he believed it was the usurpation of private groves that had
been at the heart of the trouble.
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In both these cases, the youth admitted that the palm groves in question were the
property of the elders, but were not willing to allow rights of ownership to interfere
with their ability to pay tax. Colonial officials were caught in the middle. These con-
tradictions were similar to those that operated at a national level. Phillips (1989) has
described British colonialism in West Africa as a “makeshift settlement.” The initial
ambition of importing private property in land, wage labor, and plantation agriculture
came up against the realities of labor costs, land tenure systems, and the need to placate
traditional authorities in order to maintain law and order. While she focuses on the con-
flicting aims that faced individual governors, it is clear these same contradictions also
forced local administrators into a balancing act.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have described the political economy of property rights as part of a
micro-level study of institutional change. Certain Igbo groups responded to the rising
commercial value of palm produce by curtailing private rights over palm trees. I have
presented a model in which this outcome is in the interests of both those with trees
and those without. Because defense of property rights is costly, a regulated scheme
of communal harvesting may be preferable to the private-defense equilibrium, and a
rise in the price of output can make such an arrangement viable. I have used a model
along with colonial court records to explain the political economy of disputes over palm
trees that occurred in Igbo communities during the first half of the twentieth century.
These were understandable as conflicts between the economic and political interests of
elders with property and a tenuous grasp on village authority with youth, who had little
property, the burden of bride-payments, and aspirations to political power.
I have added to our understanding of common property, collective action, and the
impact of trade on the commons. For the Igbo, common property existed because it
helped reduce the costs of defending private property that had intensified as palm oil
became commercialized. It provided a mechanism by which those who did not own
trees of their own were still enabled to pay tax. The collective action needed for the op-
eration of this scheme was facilitated by the relative ease of detecting violations, by the
small size of Igbo communities, and by the fact that it could be enacted within an ex-
isting institutional arrangement. It was hindered by the diffuseness of authority in Igbo
society, by instances where the rules governing harvesting were not clear, and by the ad-
ditional complications created by the Native Courts as a competing jurisdiction. These
points echo the general findings of Ostrom (1991). Trade did not undermine common
property or collective action in the Igbo case, but instead strengthened them.
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APPENDIX A. EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL
A.1. θ as a fixed parameter. Suppose the elder is unable to choose θ, which is instead
set by custom or by technological constraints. In that case, the condition that V CE > V
P
E
reduces to: ((
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)−
(
c
c+ d
)2)
p > k¯
It will only be possible to satisfy this condition if θ is sufficiently small that the coeffi-
cient on p on the left hand side is positive. If this is the case, then communal property
is preferred if the price of palm oil is sufficiently high. This is similar to the condition
given in (20), except that the elder will never prefer communal property if the share he
must surrender is too great.
A.2. Other responses.
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A.2.1. Cooperativemonitoring. Suppose now that, rather than one elder and one youth,
there are N elders and N youth. I abstract away from negative spillovers that can arise
from private monitoring by allowing each youth to steal from only one particular grove.
That is, youth i can only steal from elder i, youth j can only steal from elder j, and so on.
To further simplify the analysis, I will only consider symmetric equilibria.
Elders may now devote their efforts to either private monitoring, m, or cooperative
monitoring g. The marginal cost of cooperative monitoring is δ. Define G ≡ ∑Ni=1 gi as
the total amount of cooperative monitoring, and G−i ≡ G− gi as total monitoring by all
elders apart from elder i. I dispense with i subscripts below. If youth i devotes s units of
effort to stealing from elder i, elder i devotesm units of effort to private monitoring, and
total cooperative monitoring is G, then the youth is able to successfully steal a fraction
s
m+s+G
of the oil, while the elder retains a fraction m+G
m+s+G
.
Each elder’s problem can be written as:
(26) V PCME = max
m,g
{
m+ g +G−i
g +m+ s+G−i
p− dm− δg
}
,
while each youth’s problem can be written as:
(27) V PCMY = max
s
{
s
g +m+ s+G−i
p− cs
}
.
Both (26) and (27) are concave, and so they can be maximized from their first-order
conditions. Each elder’s best responses, then, are:
(28) mPCMBR = max
{√
sp
d
− s− g −G−i, 0
}
,
and
(29) gPCMBR = max
{√
sp
δ
− s−m−G−i, 0
}
.
The youth’s best response is:
(30) sPCMBR = max
{√
(m+G)p
c
−m−G, 0
}
.
Comparing (28) and (29), it is apparent that the elder will either monitor privately or
cooperatively, but not both. He will monitor cooperatively if d > δ, and privately other-
wise. If d ≤ δ, then, this collapses to the baseline private property case.This is the first
result of considering cooperative monitoring. Although it provides social benefits (from
the perspective of the elders) that private monitoring does not, a self-interested elder
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does not consider these in his decision. Cooperative monitoring entails a collective ac-
tion problem, and may be under-provided.
Consider the outcome where d ≤ δ, and cooperative monitoring occurs. In a symmet-
ric equilibrium, G−i = (N − 1)g. Substituting this into (29) and (30) and setting m = 0
gives equilibrium stealing and monitoring:
(31) gPCM∗ =
(
c
c+ δ
)2
p
Nc
,
and
(32) sPCM∗ =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2
p
δ
.
Substituting (31) and (32) into (26) and (27) gives the equilibrium payoffs under private
property with cooperative monitoring:
(33) V PCME =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
δ
c
)
p,
and
(34) V PCMY =
(
c
c+ δ
)2
p.
Now consider the case of communal property. Assume again that there is a fixed cost
k¯. I restrict analysis to the case where each elder offers the same θ. As with private moni-
toring, I assume that cooperative monitoring under communal property has a marginal
cost σ > 0 that is lower than the cost of monitoring under private property (δ). Condi-
tional on θ, each elder’s problem can be written as:
(35) V CCME = max
m,g
{
m+ g +G−i
g +m+ s+G−i
(1− θ)p− γm− σg − k¯
}
,
while each youth’s problem can be written as:
(36) V CCMY = max
s
{
θp+
s
g +m+ s+G−i
(1− θ)p− cs
}
.
As in the private case, these can be solved from their first order conditions, giving best
response functions:
(37) mCCMBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
γ
− s− g −G−i, 0
}
,
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(38) gCCMBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
σ
− s−m−G−i, 0
}
,
and:
(39) sCCMBR = max
{√
(m+G)(1− θ)p
c
−m−G, 0
}
.
As under private property, cooperative monitoring will only occur if it is individually
rational, that is, if γ ≥ σ. Otherwise, this collapses to the case without cooperative
monitoring. Following similar logic to the above, the equilibrium levels of cooperative
monitoring and theft in a symmetric equilibrium with γ ≥ σ are:
(40) gCCM∗ =
(
c
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p
Nc
,
and
(41) sCCM∗ =
(
σ
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p
σ
.
Payoffs conditional on θ are:
(42) V CCMY =
(
σ
c+ σ
)2(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
d
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯.
and
(43) V CCMY = θp+
(
c
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p.
If each elder chooses θ subject to the constraint that V CCMY ≥ V PCMY , this gives an
optimal θ of
(44) θCCM∗ =
(
δ
c+δ
)2 − ( σ
c+σ
)2
1− ( σ
c+σ
)2 .
Substituting this into (42) and (43) gives equilibrium payoffs:
(45) V CCME =
(
c
c+ δ
)2(
c+ 2δ
c+ 2σ
)(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
d
c
)
p− k¯,
and
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(46) V CCMY =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2
p.
As in the case without cooperative monitoring, these payoffs ensure that the elder will
prefer private property so long as the price of oil is above a given threshold.
A.2.2. Wage labor. Suppose the elder hires the youth to gather palm oil. He offers a
piece-rate wage of w for each unit of oil delivered. The youth, however, can steal some
of this oil for himself. As before, if the youth exerts effort s in stealing and the elder exerts
effortm in monitoring, assuming the same marginal costs as under the standard private
property case, the youth will successfully steal a fraction s
m+s
of the oil, while the elder
will receive a share m
m+s
. Thus, the elder’s problem, conditional on w, can be written as:
(47) V WE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(p− w)− dm
}
,
while the youth’s problem can be written as:
(48) V WY = max
s
{(
1− s
m+ s
)
w +
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
Each player’s best response function can be found from the first order conditions, as
above. These can then be used to solve for equilibrium levels of stealing and monitoring.
Conditional on w, the elder and youth receive payoffs:
(49) V WE =
(
c
c+ d
)2
(p− w),
and
(50) V WY = w +
(
d
c+ d
)2
(p− w).
Comparing the expression for V WE in (49) to the expression for V
P
E in (7), it is apparent
that the elder can do no better paying a wage than he can under private property. If
w = 0, he does just as well paying a wage, while if w > 0 he does worse.
A.2.3. Paidmonitoring. Suppose the elder hires a youth to monitor on his behalf. There
will be no possible efficiency gains unless the youth’s marginal cost of monitoring is less
than that of the elder. Call this e < d. The elder offers a piece-rate wage ofw for each unit
of oil delivered. I abstract away from the problem that the hired monitor might steal,
and instead focus on the elder’s problem of providing the paid monitor with incentives
to increase his effort.
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If the thieving youth exerts effort s in stealing and the hired youth exerts effort m
in monitoring, the thief will successfully steal a fraction s
m+s
of the oil, while the paid
monitor will deliver a share m
m+s
to the elder. In equilibrium, both s and m will depend
on w. Thus, the elder’s problem can be written as:
(51) V PME = max
m,w
{
m(w)
m(w) + s(w)
(p− w)
}
.
The monitor’s problem, conditional on w, can be written as:
(52) V PMM = max
m
{
m
m+ s
w − em
}
,
while the thief’s problem can be written as:
(53) V PMY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
Following the same logic used to solve the standard private property case, equilibrium
theft and monitoring will be given by:
(54) mPM∗ =
p
c
(
wc
pe+ wc
)2
,
and
(55) sPM∗ =
w
e
(
pe
pe+ wc
)2
.
Substituting these into (56), the elder’s problem can be rewritten as:
(56) V PME = max
m
{
wc
wc+ pe
(p− w)
}
.
Solving (56) from its first order conditions gives the elder’s optimal wage:
(57) wPM∗ =
√
e(e+ c)− e
c
p.
Thus, the elder’s payoff is:
(58) V PME =
(
c+ 2e− 2√e(e+ c)
c
)
p.
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Because (58) is decreasing in e, the elder will only be able to do better than under
private or common property if the hired youth’s cost of monitoring is sufficiently low.
A.3. Other considerations.
A.3.1. Altruism. Suppose that, in addition to valuing their own payoffs, each player has
an altruism parameter α ∈ [0, 1], which he uses to weight the payoff received by the
other player. Denoting payoffs as y, this is is equivalent to stating that VY = yY + αyE,
and VE = yE + αyY . Under these conditions, the elder’s problem with private property
can be rewritten as:
(59) V PAE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
p− dm+ α
(
s
m+ s
p− cs
)}
,
while the youth’s payoff is given as
(60) V PAY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs+ α
(
m
m+ s
p− dm
)}
.
Following similar steps to those given above gives equilibrium stealing and monitor-
ing:
(61) mPA∗ =
(
c
c+ d
)2
(1− α)p
c
,
and
(62) sPA∗ =
(
d
c+ d
)2
(1− α)p
d
.
It is clear from (67) and (68) that both players restrict effort as a result of their altruism.
Equilibrium payoffs under private property become:
(63) V PAE =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
p+ α
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
p,
and
(64) V PAY =
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
p+ α
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
p.
Altruism, then, reduces each player’s effort, increasing both players’ material payoffs,
even ignoring any utility benefits from altruism.
Under communal property, the players’ payoffs can be rewritten to include altruism.
For the elder, taking θ as given, this becomes:
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(65) V CAE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯ + α
(
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs
)}
,
while the youth’s payoff is given as
(66) V CAY = max
s
{
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs+ α
(
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯
)}
.
Following the same logic as before gives equilibrium stealing and monitoring:
(67) mCA∗ =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− α)(1− θ)p
c
,
and
(68) sCA∗ =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− α)(1− θ)p
γ
.
Payoffs, conditional on θ, become:
(69) V CAE =
(
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯ + α
(
θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
(1− θ)p
)
,
and
(70) V CAY = θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
(1− θ)p+ α
((
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯
)
.
If the elder selects θ subject to the constraint that V CAY ≥ V PAY , he will choose:
θCA∗ =
B1 −B2 + α(A1 − A2)
1−B2 − αA2 +
αk¯
p(1−B2 − αA2) ,(71)
where
A1 =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
,
A2 =
(
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
,
B1 =
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
,
B2 =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
.
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The final payoffs can be obtained by substituting (71) into (69) and (70). Now that
the fixed administrative costs of communal property enter into the youth’s payoff, the
elder’s offer of θCA∗ is contingent on p. In addition, the fact that each player takes the
other’s payoffs into account when evaluating his own utility means that the condition
V CAE ≥ V PAE no longer necessarily simplifies to a cutoff value for p.
A.3.2. Seniority. Suppose now that the standard game with one elder and one youth is
repeated infinitely. The youth and elder each discount future payoffs by the factor β.
The elder remains an elder indefinitely. Each period, there is a probability pi that the
youth can be promoted to the rank of elder. If that happens, the original elder and the
newly made elder continue playing the game as elders with two newly-created youths.
The purpose of this extension to the model is to assess the effect of a youth’s future
prospect of becoming an elder on outcomes under both private and communal prop-
erty.
First, consider private property. I discuss one particular “cooperative” outcome, in
which cooperation is sustained by the threat of a trigger strategy. In particular, the
elder retains the the entirety of his harvest for himself, offering nothing to the youth.
The youth’s adherence to private property, then, is sustained by nothing more than the
promise that he will some day have property of his own.
For simplicity, I assume the elder does not monitor in this scenario. This gives the
youth the opportunity to steal the oil for himself with negligible effort. Even so, the
elder may be able to sustain the youth’s cooperation through the threat of reverting to
a punishment strategy and revoking the possibility of promotion to the rank of elder if
the youth steals. Because the equilibrium in the static game is also a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium, it is a natural candidate for a punishment strategy. If this occurs, the
youth receives V PY and the elder receives V
P
E forever, and the youth is never made an
elder. Private property with no stealing will be implementable so long as the youth’s
payoff from continuation is greater than his payoff from the optimal one-shot deviation
and its associated continuation payoff.
I denote V PCY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who never deviates,
V PDY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who deviates in the current period,
V PCE as the present value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth never deviates, and
V PDE as the present value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth deviates in the current
period. Following the setup above, these payoffs can be written as:
(72) V PCY = 0 + β
(
(1− pi)V PCY + piV PCE
)
,
(73) V PDY = p+
β
1− β
(
d
c+ d
)2
p ≡ p+ β
1− βλY p,
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(74) V PCE =
p
1− β ,
and
(75) V PDE = 0 +
β
1− β
(
c
c+ d
)2
p ≡ β
1− βλEp.
It is possible to use (74) to re-write (72) as:
(76) V PCY =
βpip
(1− β)(1− β + βpi) .
Thus, the youth will cooperate so long as V PCY ≥ V PDY , which simplifies to:
(77) pi ≥ p¯iP ≡
(
1− β
β
)(
1− β(1− λY )
β(1− λY )
)
.
Thus, if the youth’s prospect of becoming an elder is sufficiently promising, it can
sustain his adherence to private property.
Now, consider a similar scenario under communal harvesting. Here, the elder offers
the youth a share θ of the oil each period, keeping a share (1− θ) for himself. As before,
the elder does not monitor, giving the youth the opportunity to deviate with negligible
effort and appropriate the remaining share (1 − θ) for himself. Again, the punishment
strategy used is reversion to the static equilibrium under private property, and perma-
nent removal of the possibility that the youth becomes an elder.
I denote V CCY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who never deviates,
V CDY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who deviates in the current period,
V CCE as the present value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth never deviates, and
V CDE as the present value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth deviates in the current
period. Following the setup above, these payoffs can be written as:
(78) V CCY = θp+ β
(
(1− pi)V CCY + piV CCE
)
,
(79) V CDY = p+
β
1− βλY p,
(80) V CCE =
(1− θ)p
1− β ,
and
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(81) V PDE = 0 +
β
1− βλEp.
It is possible to use (80) to re-write (78) as:
(82) V CCY =
(1− β − βpi)θ + βpi
(1− β)(1− β + βpi)p.
Thus, the youth will cooperate so long as V CCY ≥ V CDY . If 1−β−βpi > 0, this simplifies
to:
(83) θ ≥ (1− β + βλY )(1− β + βpi)− βpi
1− β − βpi .
If, however, 1 − β − βpi < 0, then the youth always deviates. The condition in (83)
becomes a restriction that θ is less than a negative number, which cannot occur. This
will be the case if either β or pi are sufficiently large that the adverse effect of an increase
in θ on the youth’s expected payoff when he becomes an elder outweighs the benefit
while he is a youth.
Comparing V CCE with V
PC
Y , it is clear that the elder will prefer private property so long
as he can induce the youth to cooperate, since his per-period payoff is greater (p versus
(1−θ)p). The possible advantage of common property here becomes the range of pi over
which the youth’s cooperation can be secured. Define the following cutoff value for pi:
(84) p¯iC ≡
(
1− β
β
)(
1− β(1− λY )− θ
β(1− λY )− θ
)
.
If the youth is sufficiently patient, i.e. if β > 1
2(1−λY ) , then 1 − β(1 − λY ) < β(1 − λY ).
If this case holds, then p¯iC < p¯iP for any θ > 0. Otherwise, p¯iC > p¯iP for any θ > 0. Under
communal property, it may be possible for the elder to secure the youth’s cooperation,
even if pi < p¯iP . If the youth is sufficiently patient, the elder will be better off gaining
this cooperation than under infinite repetition of the static game. Consider the extreme
case, where pi = 0. Then, (83) simplifies to θ > 1 − β + βλY . If the elder makes this
minimal offer of θ to the youth, he will be better off than with the infinite repetition of
the static game so long as (1 − (1 − β + βλY ))p > λEp. This simplifies to the condition
that β > λY
1−λE , i.e. that the youth is sufficiently patient.
